The flight landed safely in Paris 6 hours and 40 minutes after the mayday call. The deadliest accident of the airline occurred on June 1, 2009, when Air France Flight 447, an Airbus A330-203, crashed into the Atlantic Ocean with 228 fatalities. On 1 June 2009, the Airbus A330 serving the flight stalled and did not recover, eventually crashing into the Atlantic Ocean at 02:14 UTC, killing all 228 passengers and crew. [62] The other first officer Bonin turned the aircraft slightly to the left and decreased its speed from Mach 0.82 to Mach 0.8, which was the recommended speed to penetrate through turbulence. On 6 December 2011, Popular Mechanics published an English translation of the analysis of the transcript of the CVR controversially leaked in the book Erreurs de Pilotage. The Daily Telegraph pointed out the absence of AoA information, which is so important in identifying and preventing a stall. [99], Commercial air transport crews routinely encounter this type of storm in this area. Air France has been in operation since 1933. Following its investigation, the BEA recommended that the European Aviation Safety Agency and the FAA should consider making an AoA indicator on the instrument panel mandatory. [256] The co-pilots had spent three nights in Rio de Janeiro, but the BEA was unable to retrieve data regarding their rest and could not determine their activities during the stopover. [72][31] Robert pushed his side-stick forward to lower the nose and recover from the stall; however, Bonin was still pulling his side-stick back. [205], Between May 2008 and March 2009, nine incidents involving the temporary loss of airspeed indication appeared in the air safety reports (ASRs) for Air France's A330/A340 fleet. This can't be true. Some systems generated failure messages only about the consequences, but never mentioned the origin of the problem. [260][261], Several cases have occurred where inaccurate airspeed information led to flight incidents on the A330 and A340. [224][i], In October 2011, a transcript of the CVR was leaked and published in the book Erreurs de Pilotage (Pilot Errors) by Jean Pierre Otelli. It provides an explanation for most of the pitch-up inputs by the pilot flying, left unexplained in the Popular Mechanics piece: namely that the flight director display was misleading. [2]:137, On 27 May 2011, the BEA released an update on its investigation describing the history of the flight as recorded by the FDR. [223][200] The FDRs also revealed that the aircraft's descent into the sea was not due to mechanical failure or the aircraft being overwhelmed by the weather, but because the flight crew had raised the aircraft's nose, reducing its speed until it entered an aerodynamic stall. [228] One factor may be that since the A330 does not normally accept control inputs that would cause a stall, the pilots were unaware that a stall could happen when the aircraft switched to an alternate mode due to failure of the airspeed indication. [125][126] Air France has been in operation since 1933. [3][page needed]. One engine and the avionics bay, containing onboard computers, had also been raised. [76][dead link][224], While the inconsistent airspeed data caused the disengagement of the autopilot, the reason the pilots lost control of the aircraft remains something of a mystery, in particular because pilots would normally try to lower the nose in the event of a stall. [224] In the commentary accompanying the article, they also noted that the failure to follow principles of crew resource management was a contributory factor. [141][188][189][190] The search ended with the remaining 74 bodies still not recovered.[191]. The pilot-in-control pulled back on the stick, thus increasing the angle of attack and causing the aircraft to, The pilots apparently did not notice that the aircraft had reached its. [29], A 99% Invisible podcast episode about the flight, entitled "Children of the Magenta (Automation Paradox, pt. [211][212], After discussing these issues with the manufacturer, Air France sought a means of reducing these incidents, and Airbus indicated that the new pitot probe designed for the A320 was not designed to prevent cruise-level ice-over. [114][115], Also on 2 June, two French Navy vessels, the frigate Ventôse and helicopter-carrier Mistral, were en route to the suspected crash site. [citation needed]. [254] Although the BEA could find no "objective" indications that the pilots of Flight 447 were suffering from fatigue,[2]:100[255] some exchanges recorded on the CVR, including a remark made by Captain Dubois that he had only slept an hour,[k] could indicate the crew were not well rested before the flight. [247] The paper stated, "though angle of attack readings are sent to onboard computers, there are no displays in modern jets to convey this critical information to the crews". A selected list of the most noteworthy of these events is given below. [277], In November 2015, Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor David Mindell discussed the Air France Flight 447 tragedy in the opening segment of an EconTalk podcast dedicated to the ideas in Mindell's 2015 book Our Robots, Ourselves: Robotics and the Myths of Autonomy. [131][132][133] They were transported to shore, first by the frigates Constituição and Bosísio to the islands of Fernando de Noronha, and thereafter by air to Recife for identification. '[87][88], The remainder of the messages occurred from 02:11 UTC to 02:14 UTC, containing a fault message for an Air Data Inertial Reference Unit (ADIRU) and the Integrated Standby Instrument System (ISIS). [262], Another incident on TAM Flight 8091, from Miami to Rio de Janeiro on 21 May 2009, involving an A330-200, showed a sudden drop of outside air temperature, then loss of air data, the ADIRS, autopilot and autothrust. [218][2]:216 This requirement was incorporated into ADs issued by the European Aviation Safety Agency on 31 August[218] and by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on 3 September. The French authorities opened two investigations: On 5 June 2009, the BEA cautioned against premature speculation as to the cause of the crash. [209] Air France chose to equip its fleet with the Thales pitot tubes. Appropriate means must be provided (visual warning directly visible to the crew) to inform the crew of any nonfunctioning of the heating system". The last message reported that the aircraft had passed waypoint INTOL (1°21′39″S 32°49′53″W / 1.36083°S 32.83139°W / -1.36083; -32.83139), located 565 km (351 mi; 305 nmi) off Natal, on Brazil's north-eastern coast. The investigators also pointed to the lack of a clear display of the airspeed inconsistencies, though the computers had identified them. The aircraft remained stalled during its entire 3-minute 30 second descent from 38,000 feet (12,000 m). All 228 passengers and crew on board died on impact from extreme trauma and the aircraft was destroyed. [78][79][80][dead link] These messages, sent to prepare maintenance workers on the ground prior to arrival, were transmitted between 02:10 UTC and 02:15 UTC,[81] and consisted of five failure reports and nineteen warnings. At this point, the aircraft's angle of attack was 16 degrees, and the engine thrust levers were in the fully forward takeoff/go-around detent (TOGA). [213] By 17 June 2009, Air France had replaced all pitot probes on its A330 type aircraft. All passengers and crew evacuated successfully. The NTSB also examined a similar 23 June 2009 incident on a Northwest Airlines flight from Hong Kong to Tokyo,[263] concluding in both cases that the aircraft operating manual was sufficient to prevent a dangerous situation from occurring. [279], Charles Duhigg writes about Flight 447 extensively in his book Smarter Faster Better, particularly about the errors the pilots made due to cognitive tunneling. [128], By 16 June 2009, 50 bodies had been recovered from a wide area of the ocean. [65] At the same time he abruptly pulled back on his side-stick, raising the nose. ", For an explanation of how airspeed is measured, see, BEA's final report July 2012 page 177 paragraph 8, BEA's final report July 2012 page 179 paragraph 5, Rio de Janeiro/Galeão International Airport, Bureau of Enquiry and Analysis for Civil Aviation Safety, Learn how and when to remove this template message, Rio de Janeiro–Galeão International Airport, Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System, Aeronautical Accidents Investigation and Prevention Center, German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation, Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la Sécurité de l'Aviation Civile, List of aircraft accidents and incidents resulting in at least 50 fatalities, "Report on Air France Crash Points to Pilot Training Issues", "F-GZCP Air France Airbus A330-203 – cn 660", "EASA Type Certificate Data Sheet for AIRBUS A330", "JACDEC Special accident report Air France Flight 447", "Key figures in global battle against illegal arms trade lost in Air France crash", "Three Irish doctors die in mystery jet tragedy", "Zeisterse in verdwenen Air France vlucht", "Alexander kommer aldri tilbake på skolen", "Violeta Bajenaru-Declerck, romanca aflata la bordul Air France 447", "В пропавшем над Атлантикой самолете был россиянин Андрей Киселев", "Aj tretí Slovák zo strateného letu bol z Levického okresu", "Andrés Suárez Montes: Nueva vida en París", "Airbus disparu: témoignages, hypothèses et démenti", "American couple on Flight 447 loved life, relatives say", "Air France jet with 215 people on board 'drops off radar, "Air France statement on crashed airliner in the Atlantic", "Captain of Air France Flight 447 was son of pilot", "Four minutes, 23 seconds – Flight AF447", "Inhumés trois ans après le crash aérien", "What Really Happened Aboard Air France 447", "Flight 447 pilot had 20 years of flying for Air France", "Ships head for area where airplane debris spotted", "Terminal said 'delayed' but the faces betrayed the truth", "Search Is on for Wreckage of Missing Air France Jet", "Air France pays $24,500 to crash victims' families", "Voo Air France 447: últimas informações", "Cotidiano – Família Orleans e Bragança confirma que príncipe brasileiro estava no voo AF 447", "Belgisch-Braziliaanse prins onder de slachtoffers", "Confira os nomes de 84 passageiros que estavam no voo AF 447", TRENTO10 anni fa la tragedia dell’Air France che costò la vita a Giovanni Battista Lenzi, "Airbus: apólice de US$94 mi e seguro incalculável", "Lista não oficial de vítimas do voo 447 da Air France inclui executivos, médicos e até um membro da família Orleans e Bragança", Professor da UFRJ está entre os passageiros do voo AF 447, "Good Morning – Turkey press scan on 2 June", Outro professor da UFRJ também está entre os passageiros do voo AF 447, "Safety Investigation Following the Accident on 1st June 2009 to the Airbus A300-203, Flight AF 447 – Summary", https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jM3CwBYX-ms, "Flight AF 447 on 1st June 2009, A330-203, registered F-GZCP, 27 May 2011 briefing", "Recording Indicates Pilot Wasn't in Cockpit During Critical Phase", "Concerns over recovering AF447 recorders", "Data Link Messages Hold Clues to Air France Crash", "Airbus 330 – Systems – Maintenance System", "Joint aircraft system/component code table and definitions", "Air France Captain Dubois Let Down by 1-Pound Part, Pilots Say", "Crash: Air France A332 over Atlantic on 1 June 2009, aircraft impacted ocean", "Crash: Air France A332 over Atlantic on 1 June 2009, aircraft lost", "Air France Flight 447: A detailed meteorological analysis", "Air France Flight #447: did weather play a role in the accident? [177][178] An American Remora 6000 remotely operated vehicle (ROV)[g] and operations crew from Phoenix International experienced in the recovery of aircraft for the United States Navy were on board the Île de Sein. The two co-pilots' task sharing was weakened both by incomprehension of the situation at the time of autopilot disconnection, and by poor management of the ". [165][166][167] A smaller area to the south-west was also searched, based on a re-analysis of sonar recordings made by Émeraude the previous year. [184], On 7 May, the flight recorders, under judicial seal, were taken aboard the French Navy patrol boat La Capricieuse for transfer to the port of Cayenne. [5][24][25] Among the 216 passengers were 126 men, 82 women and eight children (including one infant). (via nh6central on YouTube) On the 26th of June 1988, a brand new Air France Airbus A320 on a charter flight with 136 people on b oard performed a low speed fly-by at an airshow in the city of Mulhouse. Put bluntly, big passenger planes do not just fall out of the sky. [88][89] At 02:12 UTC, a warning message NAV ADR DISAGREE indicated that there was a disagreement between the three independent air data systems. Other ships sent to the site included the French research vessel Pourquoi Pas?, equipped with two mini-submarines able to descend to 6,000 m (20,000 ft),[116][117] since the area of the Atlantic in which the aircraft went down was thought to be as deep as 4,700 m (15,400 ft). Guy Gratton, an aviation expert from the Flight Safety Laboratory at Brunel University, said, "This is an air accident the likes of which we haven't seen before. Its mission was to assist in the search for the missing flight recorders or "black-boxes" that might be located at great depth. The flight controls are not mechanically linked between the two pilot seats, and Robert, the left-seat pilot who believed he had taken over control of the aircraft, was not aware that Bonin continued to hold the stick back, which overrode Robert's own control. French judges have dropped manslaughter charges against Airbus and Air France over the 2009 crash of Air France 447, instead blaming the pilots. 12: Update on anemometric sensors", "Airlines ordered to replace speed probes linked to Air France crash", "Airbus Recommends Airlines Replace Speed Sensors", "Flight Air France 447: List of all published press releases", "Navigation – Airspeed Pitot Probes – Replacement", "FAA Airworthiness Directive FR Doc E9-21368", "Airbus gives new warning on speed sensors", "Airbus Document Acknowledges Pitot Problem", "Report on Air France 447 crash deepens mystery", "AF447 stalled but crew maintained nose-up attitude", "Rio-Paris : l'ombre d'une erreur de pilotage", "Air France 447 Stalled at High Altitude, Official BEA Report Confirms", "AF447 pilot: 'Damn it, we're going to crash, "Latest Report on AF447 Crash Calls for New Training and Flight Data", "Air France 447 crash report: pilots "lacked training" to deal with stall warnings", "Air France Flight 447 – will all be revealed? L'accident du vol Air France 447, aussi appelé crash du Rio-Paris, a lieu le 1 er juin 2009.L'Airbus A330-200 assurant le vol entre Rio de Janeiro et Paris s'abîme dans l'océan Atlantique, entraînant la mort des 228 personnes à bord.C'est l'accident le plus meurtrier de l'histoire d'Air France [1]. [b] ACARS can be used by the aircraft's on-board computers to send messages automatically, and F-GZCP transmitted a position report approximately every ten minutes. [131], The BEA documented the timeline of discoveries in its first interim report. During its descent, the aircraft had turned more than 180 degrees to the right to a compass heading of 270 degrees. The crash happened shortly after the distress signal, he said. [233] It highlighted the role of the co-pilot in stalling the aircraft, while the flight computer was under alternate law at high altitude. However, the 13-hour "duty time" (the total flight duration as well as pre-flight preparation) required for the Rio-Paris route exceeded the 10 hours permitted before a pilot must take a break as dictated by Air France's procedures. The areas showing very generalized bathymetry were mapped using high-density satellite altimetry. On 26 June 1988, the plane crashed while making a low pass over Mulhouse–Habsheim Airport (ICAO airport code LFGB) as part of the Habsheim Air Show. Air France Flight 447 was a scheduled commercial flight from Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, to Paris, France.The aircraft used was an Airbus A330 jet. A technical investigation was started, the goal of which was to enhance the safety of future flights. Cockpit automation, sometimes called the “glass cockpit”, comprises an ensemble of technologies that perform multiple functions. According to the final report,[2] the accident resulted from this succession of major events: These events resulted from these major factors in combination:[2]. [78][91][92][93], Weather conditions in the mid-Atlantic were normal for the time of year, and included a broad band of thunderstorms along the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ). [271][272][273][274], On 16 September 2012, Channel 4 in the UK presented Fatal Flight 447: Chaos in the Cockpit, which showed data from the black boxes including an in-depth re-enactment. [2]:24[257][258], Shortly after the crash, Air France changed the number of the regular Rio de Janeiro-Paris flight from AF447 to AF445. The Metron team used what it described as "classic" Bayesian search methods, an approach that had previously been successful in the search for the submarine USS Scorpion and SS Central America. Pilots spend much of their time managing and monitoring, rather than actively flying, their aircraft. This confirmed the findings of the preliminary reports and provided additional details and recommendations to improve safety. At 02:11:40 UTC, captain Dubois re-entered the cockpit after being summoned by first officer Robert. "[248] Against this backdrop of confusing information, difficulty with aural cognition (due to heavy buffeting from the storm, as well as the stall) and zero external visibility, the pilots had less than three minutes to identify the problem and take corrective action. Bonin heard this and replied, "But I've been at maximum nose-up for a while!" A spokesperson for the BEA claimed, "the airspeed of the aircraft was unclear" to the pilots[143] and, on 4 June 2009, Airbus issued an Accident Information Telex to operators of all its aircraft reminding pilots of the recommended abnormal and emergency procedures to be taken in the case of unreliable airspeed indication. The BEA stated that no conclusions had been made, investigations were continuing, and no interim report was expected before the summer. [147] Although France had never recovered a flight recorder from such depths,[146] there was precedent for such an operation: in 1988, an independent contractor recovered the CVR of South African Airways Flight 295 from a depth of 4,900 m (16,100 ft) in a search area of between 80 and 250 square nautical miles (270 and 860 km2; 110 and 330 sq mi). On June 1, 2009, Air France flight 447 from Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) to Paris (France) suddenly entered an aerodynamic stall and crashed into the Atlantic Ocean, killing all 228 passengers and crew onboard. There was a similar side-stick control issue in the, "I didn't sleep enough last night. [162][163] The search covered an area of 6,300 square kilometres (2,400 sq mi; 1,800 sq nmi), mostly to the north and north-west of the aircraft's last known position. The crash was the deadliest air disaster in France since the 1981 crash of Inex-Adria Aviopromet Flight 1308, in which 180 people died, and the third-deadliest French air disaster of all time, behind Flight 1308 and Turkish Airlines Flight 981. In consequence, the stall warning came on whenever the pilot pushed forward on the stick and then stopped when he pulled back; this happened several times during the stall and this may have confused the pilots. No No No! The airliner was likely to have struck the surface of the sea in a normal flight attitude, with a high rate of descent; No signs of any fires or explosions were found. [130] Other aircraft involved in the search scanned, visually, 320,000 square kilometres (120,000 sq mi; 93,000 sq nmi) of ocean and were used to direct Navy vessels involved in the recovery effort. After attending the briefing between the two co-pilots, the captain left the cockpit to rest at 02:01:46 UTC. [31][74][2] Robert pushed his side stick forward to try to regain lift for the airplane to climb out of the stall. The stall warnings stopped, as all airspeed indications were now considered invalid by the aircraft's computer due to the high angle of attack. Further, after the Flight 447 accident, Air France identified six additional incidents that had not been reported on ASRs. This has been the biggest investigation since Lockerbie. On the map, page 13 the coordinates in BEA's first interim report. [246] The pitch-up input at the beginning of the fatal sequence of events appears to be the consequence of an altimeter error. ", The flight data recorders stopped recording at 02:14:28 UTC, 3 hours and 45 minutes after takeoff. Jean Lapierre, the Canadian Minister of Transport, referred to Flight 358 as a “miracle” because everybody survived. A 2001 Airworthiness Directive (AD) required these to be replaced with either a later Goodrich design, part number 0851HL, or with pitot tubes made by Thales, part number C16195AA. When he received no response, he asked the crew of another Air France flight (AF459) to try to contact AF447; this also met with no success. Its aircraft have been involved in a number of major accidents and incidents. The BEA's final report, released at a news conference on 5 July 2012, concluded that the aircraft crashed after temporary inconsistencies between the airspeed measurements—likely due to the aircraft's pitot tubes being obstructed by ice crystals—caused the autopilot to disconnect, after which the crew reacted incorrectly and ultimately caused the aircraft to enter an aerodynamic stall, from which it did not recover. [259], Six months later, on 30 November 2009, Air France Flight 445 operated by another Airbus A330-203 (registered F-GZCK) made a mayday call because of severe turbulence around the same area and at a similar time to when Flight 447 was lost. [44], The aircraft departed from Rio de Janeiro–Galeão International Airport on 31 May 2009 at 19:29 Brazilian Standard Time (22:29 UTC),[2]:21 with a scheduled arrival at Paris-Charles de Gaulle Airport at 11:03 Central European Summer Time (09:03 UTC) the following day (estimated flight time of 10:34). But what's happening? In 2009, tests suggested that the new probe could improve its reliability, prompting Air France to accelerate the replacement program,[212] which started on 29 May. The pilots had not applied the unreliable-airspeed procedure. [262] In the second incident, an Air France A340-300 (F-GLZN) en route from Paris to New York encountered turbulence followed by the autoflight systems going offline, warnings over the accuracy of the reported airspeed, and 2 minutes of stall alerts. But as hundreds of spectators looked on, the plane plowed into a forest and crashed, sending fire billowing up over the airfield. In September 2007, Airbus recommended that Thales C16195AA pitot tubes should be replaced by Thales model C16195BA to address the problem of water ingress that had been observed. [204] French Transport Minister Dominique Bussereau said, "Obviously, the pilots [of Flight 447] did not have the [correct] speed showing, which can lead to two bad consequences for the life of the aircraft: under-speed, which can lead to a stall, and over-speed, which can lead to the aircraft breaking up because it is approaching the speed of sound and the structure of the plane is not made for enduring such speeds". This "simple but persistent" human error was given as the most direct cause of this accident. [220][221][222] Safety recommendations issued by BEA for pitot probes design, recommended, "they must be fitted with a heating system designed to prevent any malfunctioning due to icing. F-GZCP was scheduled to have its pitot tubes replaced as soon as it returned to Paris. [267] The case against Airbus was dropped on 22 July the same year. In particular: The BEA assembled a human factors working group to analyze the crew's actions and reactions during the final stages of the flight. [9] The aircraft underwent a major overhaul on 16 April 2009, and at the time of the accident had accumulated about 18,870 flying hours. [5], The aircraft involved in the accident was a 4 year old Airbus A330-203, with manufacturer serial number (MSN) 660, registered as F-GZCP. [64] The engines' auto-thrust systems disengaged three seconds later. A post-crash fire destroyed the aircraft. To comply with these procedures, Flight 447 was crewed by three pilots: a captain and two first officers. More precisely: that after one of the three independent systems had been diagnosed as faulty and excluded from consideration, the two remaining systems disagreed. [150], France requested two "towed pinger locator hydrophones" from the United States Navy to help find the aircraft. Actual video of the crash of Air France flight 296. The Émeraude was to work with the mini-sub Nautile, which can descend to the ocean floor. [82][83][84][85], Among the ACARS transmissions at 02:10 is one message that indicates a fault in the pitot-static system. ...This aural environment certainly played a role in altering the crew’s response to the situation. All occurred in cruise between flight levels FL310 and FL380. [2]:122[206] The problems primarily occurred in 2007 on the A320, but awaiting a recommendation from Airbus, Air France delayed installing new pitot tubes on A330/A340 and increased inspection frequencies in these aircraft. The accident occurred on 2 August 2005 20:03 UTC (16:03 EDT). "[240], In a July 2011 article in Aviation Week, Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger was quoted as saying the crash was a "seminal accident" and suggested that pilots would be able to better handle upsets of this type if they had an indication of the wing's angle of attack (AoA). [264], Following the crash of Air France 447, other Airbus A330 operators studied their internal flight records to seek patterns. In an aural environment that was already saturated by the C-chord warning... "[253], Getting enough sleep is a constant challenge for pilots of long-haul flights. Air France CEO Pierre-Henri Gourgeon called finding the cockpit voice recorder “yet another decisive step forward in the inquiry.” Determining the cause of the crash took on new importance in March, when a French judge filed preliminary manslaughter charges against Air France and planemaker Airbus. Its first flight was on 25 February 2005, and it was delivered 2 months later to the airline on 18 April 2005. [95][96][97][98] During its final hour, Flight 447 encountered areas of light turbulence. At the time of the crash, it was Air France's newest A330. "[234] The BEA subsequently released its final report on the accident, and Appendix 1 contained an official CVR transcript that did not include groups of words deemed to have no bearing on flight. Shortly thereafter, the ground proximity warning system sounded an alarm, warning the crew about the aircraft's imminent crash with the ocean. [265][266], Air France and Airbus have been investigated for manslaughter since 2011, but in 2019, prosecutors recommended dropping the case against Airbus and charging Air France with manslaughter and negligence, concluding, "the airline was aware of technical problems with a key airspeed monitoring instrument on its planes but failed to train pilots to resolve them". [203], In the minutes before its disappearance, the aircraft's onboard systems sent a number of messages, via the ACARS, indicating disagreement in the indicated airspeed readings. The investigators recommended a blocked pitot tube should be clearly indicated as such to the crew on the flight displays. 1)", was released on 23 June 2015 as the first of a two-part story about automation. Two of those incidents involved pitot probes. Commercial aircraft fly on autopilot for much of the time. [57] The aircraft left Brazilian Atlantic radar surveillance at 01:49 UTC,[2]:49[58] and entered a communication dead zone. Or maybe Flight 447 was the Titanic, an uncrashable ship at the bottom of the sea. [176] The French government chartered the Île de Sein to recover the flight recorders from the wreckage. [156][159][160][161] Air France and Airbus jointly funded the third phase of the search. [173] The debris was found lying in a relatively flat and silty area of the ocean floor (as opposed to the extremely mountainous topography originally believed to be AF447's final resting place). [66] The aircraft's stall warning briefly sounded twice due to the angle of attack tolerance being exceeded, and the aircraft's indicated airspeed dropped sharply from 274 knots (507 km/h; 315 mph) to 52 knots (96 km/h; 60 mph).
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